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Some Hard Truths About
Agriculture and the Environment
Erik Lichtenberg
Environmental problems in agriculture have proven difficult to address due to the spatial heterogen-
eity and temporal variability intrinsic to agriculture. Agriculture is largely a struggle against nature;
both its sustainability and the prospects for improving environmental performance and farm income
simultaneously are thus inherently limited. Agriculture’s high degree of variability makes direct
regulation inefficient. Subsidies for improving environmental performance can have negative conse-
quences and have proven ineffective in practice, due largely to bureaucratic culture. Pollution taxes
should be the most effective and efficient form of policy. Interdisciplinary research is needed to
provide models for performance evaluation.
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Figuring out how to handle environmental problems
in agriculture has been extremely difficult—for
academics as well as policy makers. On the one
hand, there is a long-standing tradition of viewing
farming as an industry that is intrinsically in
harmony with nature, at least when conducted as it
ought to be. Recently, however, the popular con-
ception of farming has tended more toward a dia-
metrically opposite view. In many ways, agriculture
was the catalyst for the contemporary environmental
movement: Rachel Carson’s 1962 treatise, Silent
Spring, remains a standard reference for today’s
environmentalism. And agriculture has remained
one of the “usual suspects” in environmentalists’
lineup of malefactors.
The standard litany of environmental abuses of
modern society contains numerous contributions
from agriculture, including, among other things:
ecological damage from pesticides such as wildlife
kills and depletion of pollinator populations; human
health risks from pesticides from worker exposures,
spray drift, residues on foods, and from leaching
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into well water; surface water quality problems due
to nutrient runoff and leaching like the notorious
anoxic “dead zone” in the Gulf of Mexico, the
disappearance of underwater grasses in the Chesa-
peake Bay, the salinization of San Francisco Bay,
and BOD depletion in rivers and lakes throughout
the country; nitrate contamination of well water
from leaching of fertilizers and animal wastes; odor
from concentrated animal feeding operations,
notably hogs; bacterial contamination from spills
from waste lagoons; and air pollution from animal
feeding operations, burning straw, and dust.
Popular perceptions notwithstanding, the extent
to which agriculture contributes to these problems
remains fiercely contested in scientific circles. What
policies to adopt are no less hotly debated. In this
paper, I draw on almost three decades of scholar-
ship and practical policy experience to offer some
general lessons about how to devise policies for
addressing these problems, the likely limitations of
those policies, and how we as economists can best
contribute to the formulation of better policies. I
begin with a discussion of what I believe to be key
inherent features of agriculture itself. I then con-
sider the implications of those features for policy
and for research.
In some important ways, those implications are
not particularly heartening (hence the title of the
paper). It turns out there are limits to what can be
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said and done about these problems: There are
limits to our ability to generalize about them—
which is a problem because policy discussions
always revolve around generalizations—and there
are limits to the degree of efficiency any policy can
attain. Further, those policies likely to be most
effective are unlikely to be popular with the farm
community and governmental agricultural agen-
cies—two of our most important constituencies.
They may be equally unpopular with environmental
groups and agencies, putting us in an uncomfort-
able position politically. Such a position might be
an illustration of the popular saying “if all sides
disagree with you, you must be doing something
right”; but it’s nonetheless disquieting. Finally, the
research most needed to inform policy is of a kind
that is especially difficult to conduct and often least
rewarding from a disciplinary perspective.
Agriculture as Resource Extraction
Farming is characterized by several fundamental
differences compared to production in most other
industries. First, it is, at bottom, a resource extrac-
tion industry where production occurs primarily
under uncontrolled natural conditions. Like fishing
or forestry, farming involves harvesting biota, i.e.,
living organisms (plants, animals). And also like
fishing or forestry, this harvesting takes place out-
of-doors in the habitat of the biota being harvested.
Farming is clearly managed more intensively
than renewable resource industries which harvest
naturally occurring wild populations, such as fisher-
ies—farmers prepare and manipulate the habitat in
which these biotic resources grow as well as
establishing initial population sizes. But farming is
clearly controlled to a much lesser degree than, say,
manufacturing or services, where production occurs
under tightly controlled conditions, i.e., where the
quality of inputs and the production environment
can be manipulated at will by the firm (think about
the completely sterile conditions under which semi-
conductors are made).
Instead, farming takes place out-of-doors, where
it’s subject to all of the vagaries of the weather and
where the physical, chemical, and biological charac-
teristics of land vary in subtle, often difficult-to-
measure ways. So even though farming involves
more control than, say, fishing and forestry, the
degree of control achieved is orders of magnitude
below the standard in manufacturing or services.
Basically, crop farming amounts to trying to man-
ipulate crop ecosystems so that the mix of plants
favors desirable species and contains few of the
undesirable ones. But because crop ecosystems are
also being influenced by factors that cannot easily
be observed or predicted, control over them is
always limited.
This dependence on natural conditions means
agriculture is characterized by substantial, ineradi-
cable spatial heterogeneity and temporal variability.
Natural factors like soils, topography, climate, and
pest pressure vary significantly from one location to
another—sometimes within fields and farms just as
much as between fields and farms. Other natural
factors, like temperature, rainfall, solar radiation, and
pressure from specific weeds, insects, and diseases,
vary from day to day within seasons and from year
to year.
While firms in other industries face spatial and
temporal variability in production conditions
because of location, differences in endowments of
human capital, weather, and so on, that variability
generally doesn’t persist in the long run because
firms can relocate, train or bring in new workers,
construct plants and equipment designed to protect
production from the weather or compensate for it,
etc. But as long as farming takes place out-of-
doors, and as long as crops are planted in natural
soils, agriculture will be subject to spatial and tem-
poral variability even in the long run. Another way
of expressing this idea is that in agriculture it’s not
possible to replicate the least-cost technology pro-
duction unit because the variability in natural factors
like climate, soils, pest pressure, weather, and water
availability can’t be engineered away. Because
these factors affect both agricultural production and
environmental quality, both spatial and temporal
variability persist even in the long run.
Limited Generalizability of 
Environmental Problems
One implication of this resource- or ecosystem-based
perspective is that it is very difficult to generalize
about environmental problems associated with
farming. Take, for example, the problem of nutrient
runoff and leaching from fertilizer. A given appli-
cation of nitrogen fertilizer can result in substantial
emissions into surface water when growing condi-
tions are bad, because under these conditions a lot
of residual nitrogen is left in the soil at the end of
the growing season. But exactly the same applica-
tion on the same field can result in little or no
runoff and leaching when growing conditions are
good, because most of the nitrogen is taken up by26   April 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
the crop. Similarly, a given application of nitrogen
can cause runoff and leaching on sandy soils which
don’t hold nutrients well, but little or no leaching
on heavier soils with better water- and nutrient-
holding capacity. As a result, high nitrate concen-
trations in groundwater are a serious problem in a
few locations but extremely rare throughout most of
the country (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
1990).
The same can be said about pesticides. A given
application of some insecticides can cause fish kills
when made to a field near a stream when the wind
is blowing strongly enough in the right direction,
and yet no damage at all when made to fields far-
ther from the stream or at times when there is little
wind. Similarly, atrazine applied to corn and soy-
beans shows up in surface water when heavy rain-
storms occur shortly after application, but not
otherwise. And atrazine is observed in significant
concentrations in groundwater, but only in a handful
of locations around the country where conditions
are exceptionally favorable for leaching.
In sum, it’s rarely possible to generalize broadly
about environmental problems in agriculture for
policy purposes, except in the vaguest terms. Such
generalizations may prove useful for mobilizing
political support by partisans of one side or another
in policy debates, but they add little to substantive
understanding of the scope of the problems under
discussion and of the measures most likely to be
productive in tackling those problems.
Limits on Sustainability
Another implication of this resource- or ecosystem-
based perspective on the nature of agriculture is
that there are real limits on the “sustainability” of
agriculture. Agriculture itself is inherently unnatural
in a fundamental sense, because it involves an
attempt to maintain ecosystems unable to last with-
out continuous human intervention. Rarely, if ever,
do ecosystems as lacking in biodiversity as fields of
crops, orchards, vineyards, or tree plantations occur
in nature. If they do by some chance occur, they
don’t endure because of the bounty they offer to
weed competitors, herbivorous insects, plant para-
sites, and diseases. They also don’t endure because
of evolutionary obstacles: Maintenance of these
artificial ecosystems amounts to exercising natural
selection pressure which essentially breeds better
pests, i.e., organisms better suited to exploiting the
ecological opportunities we insist on offering year
after year.
It is not an exaggeration to say that all of agri-
culture is intrinsically a struggle against nature, an
attempt to impose and maintain ecosystems dramat-
ically distorted to serve human wants in the face of
persistent countervailing ecological pressures.
While it makes sense to exploit natural forces as
much as possible, complete harmony with nature is
impossible. The kind of productivity needed to
sustain a standard of living high enough to support
civilization cannot be achieved without fighting
nature, as the history of agriculture, replete with
periodic crop failures and famines, amply attests.
[More recently, Olmstead and Rhode (2002) have
documented the extensive breeding effort needed to
simply maintain wheat yields at existing levels in
the United States in the late 19th century.]
From this perspective, the accomplishments of
contemporary agriculture, so often maligned as
“factory farming” which produces tasteless food
and degrades the environment, are truly remarkable.
The fact that so few people and such little land are
needed to produce such an abundance of food and
fiber is a real testament to the productive power of
contemporary agriculture, as is the fact that agricul-
tural productivity has grown consistently at a rate
of about 2% a year for the past 50 years (Ball et al.,
1994; Gardner, 2002).
What this means is there are few, if any, easy
ways to improve the environmental performance of
agriculture. The scope for “win-win” solutions to
environmental problems emanating from agricul-
ture is limited. There is little prospect that farming
more “naturally” will be adequate to maintain
current living standards. In other words, tackling
environmental problems in agriculture involves
tradeoffs, i.e., substituting other scarce factors of
production for the disposal capacity of the environ-
ment. The idea that tradeoffs are inherent in policy
decisions is standard fare for economists. Yet many
(if not most) in the policy arena cling to the notion
it will be possible to solve environmental problems
in agriculture in ways that benefit farmers.
Limitations of Technological Fixes 
and “Win-Win” Solutions
The scope for “win-win” solutions benefitting both
farmers and the environment is further limited by
the location- and time-specific nature of agricultural
pollution problems, which make it very difficult to
devise simple technological fixes that can be applied
broadly. Agriculture has nothing equivalent to
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and biological processing used to remove nutrients
and bacteria from wastewater.
To be sure, agricultural R&D efforts have been
strikingly successful in developing some farming
methods and equipment designed to reduce environ-
mental spillovers. Many of these developments
seemingly improve agricultural productivity while
simultaneously protecting the environment, which
makes them extremely attractive because they
apparently involve such little pain and sacrifice. On
closer examination, though, all of these technol-
ogies clearly involve substitution of management
(in terms of both expertise and time expended) for
nature.
1 Such a substitution may appear to increase
profit because returns to management are a residual
in the owner-operated farms that predominate in
the United States. But the costs are all too real to
farmers.
Consider, for example, the class of farming equip-
ment which improves application efficiency, where-
by a larger percentage of the inputs applied goes to
the target rather than into the environment at large.
This class includes what can broadly be considered
precision agriculture systems such as low-volume
irrigation systems that permit delivery of water (and
dissolved chemicals) timed to match crop uptake,
and thus reduce water application and drainage;
variable rate application equipment that makes it
possible to adjust fertilizer application rates in
accordance with natural soil fertility; and improved
pest monitoring methods and spray equipment that
make it possible to reduce pesticide application
rates and limit spraying to areas of high infestation
(National Research Council, 1997).
The effects of these technologies on agricultural
productivity and on environmental spillovers vary
a lot from location to location and year to year. In
some locations, in some years, they improve both
agricultural productivity and environmental per-
formance a great deal, while under other conditions
they do very little. Moreover, the degree to which
they improve productivity and reduce environ-
mental spillovers, even on average, depends criti-
cally on the degree to which they are adapted to
local and seasonal variations in natural conditions.
For example, getting efficiency improvements
from low-volume irrigation requires knowledge of
crop uptake rates, which vary according to the stage
of plant growth, weather conditions, and soil qual-
ity—all of which vary from field to field and farm
to farm. Similarly, precision fertilizer application
requires knowledge of existing soil fertility levels,
which can vary substantially even within fields of
a uniform soil type. And it requires more sophis-
ticated knowledge of crop fertility response than we
have now (most fertilizer recommendations are
rough rules of thumb with little solid conceptual or
empirical basis). Precision application of pesticides
requires monitoring of pest infestation levels, popu-
lation counts of beneficial organisms that serve as
natural pest controls, and knowledge about potential
yield damage, which varies according to pest pres-
sure and stage of plant growth.
In other words, use of these technologies requires
sophisticated management, including on-the-spot
adaptation to local conditions that vary in space
(sometimes at the subfield level) and time. None of
these technologies is a turnkey system just needing
to be installed to get results; instead, each requires
considerable customization and a great deal of skill
and expertise.
This critical dependence on human skill and judg-
ment makes agriculture very different from manu-
facturing in how it adapts to new technologies. In
manufacturing, new technologies can be embodied
in machinery and equipment. In agriculture,
machinery and equipment are necessary but not
sufficient conditions for technological improve-
ments. Spatial and temporal variability make human
skill and judgment absolutely critical in imple-
menting new technologies. As a result, technical
fixes involve more than just installing or using new
equipment—they involve implementing new farming
systems and adapting them to conditions that vary
from place to place within farms (as well as between
them) and from year to year. And they require
farmers to adopt new forms of management and
acquire new sets of skills.
Up until now, the principal policy for tackling
environmental problems like nutrient emissions,
soil erosion, and animal wastes has been to rely
on public-sector development of new farming
systems to provide technological solutions for
these problems. As Huffman and Evenson (1993)
have pointed out, the development of most agri-
cultural technologies will be left to the public
sector because their management-intensity and
need for customization make intellectual prop-
erty rights difficult to obtain and enforce, and
consequently the returns from the development
of new farming practices and/or management
strategies are generally too low to justify significant
private R&D. 1  I am indebted to my colleague Doug Parker for this observation.28   April 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
While such new technologies are a necessary
condition for environmental improvements, they are
by no means sufficient. Farming is a business.
Farmers need to respond to the pressures of the
market if they’re going to be able to stay in
business and, for the most part, farmers adopt new
farming systems when and if they prove to be more
profitable than the alternatives.
The successes we’ve had over the past 70 years
show this quite clearly. Consider the case of soil
erosion. The United States has been extremely
successful in reducing erosion problems. U.S. soil
erosion rates today are a small fraction of what they
were just 70 years ago (Trimble, 1999; Trimble and
Crosson, 2000; U.S. Department of Agriculture,
2000). This progress was the result of a great deal
of public-sector effort, including the development
of farming systems for reducing erosion under a
wide variety of conditions, conducted by the USDA
and by the land grant university system, as well as
extensive promotion of these farming systems by
extension and local soil conservation districts. But
the use of soil conservation measures became wide-
spread when it was economically efficient to adopt
them. For example, widespread adoption of conser-
vation tillage was due largely to changes in the
relative prices of fuel and herbicides, making it
more profitable than traditional tillage.
The case of integrated pest management (IPM)
suggests market forces alone will generally not
suffice to get farmers to make adequate use of the
pollution-reducing technologies we already possess.
The development of integrated pest management
strategies was the result of intensive research effort
at land grant universities, USDA’s Agricultural
Research Service, and other public agricultural
research entities. Dissemination of IPM strategies
among farmers was also due to intensive effort on
the part of extension, including training IPM con-
sultants in proselytizing the virtues of IPM among
farmers. But widespread adoption of IPM was also
due to the Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA’s) aggressive use of its regulatory authority
over pesticide marketing, which gave pesticide
manufacturers good reasons for finding ways to fit
their products into IPM systems and for including
IPM in their usage recommendations.
More generally, the absence of regulation creates
a bias against using precision application systems.
Chemicals are cheap for farmers (especially when
disposal of wastes into the environment is costless,
as occurs in the absence of regulation), while man-
agement, which places a burden on farmers’ time
and expertise, is expensive. Without the incentives
provided by regulation, it’s more cost-effective for
farmers to rely more on chemicals than on manage-
ment—for example, by spraying pesticides preven-
tively rather than monitoring fields and spraying
according to an economic threshold, or by applying
fertilizer at planting time rather than monitoring
crop growth conditions and applying fertilizer in
response to ongoing crop demand.
In a nutshell, new agricultural technologies—
specifically, new farming systems—are a necessary
condition for further improvements in the environ-
mental performance of agriculture. But they are by
no means sufficient. Without more stringent envi-
ronmental regulation, there is little hope of substan-
tial additional progress.
Superiority of Incentives over 
Direct Regulation
The need for more stringent regulation raises the
question of the appropriate form of regulation. To
date, environmental agencies have relied mainly on
forms of direct regulation. That approach has
proven problematic, in large part because the local
scope, spatial heterogeneity, and temporal variabil-
ity characterizing both the environmental problems
emanating from agriculture and the technical means
for addressing them make it extremely difficult—if
not impossible—to formulate direct regulations that
make any sense.
Consider, for example, the case of nutrient man-
agement regulations in Maryland, legislated in
response to the Pfiesteria crisis of 1997. Those reg-
ulations specify that commercial fertilizers and
manure must be applied in accordance with a
nutrient management plan formulated by a certified
technician. As noted above, efficient nutrient appli-
cation rates vary from year to year depending on
soil moisture, temperature, sunshine, etc., and thus
an application rate that is efficient in a good year
can constitute gross overuse in a bad one. But a
nutrient management plan must accommodate both
contingencies—both good and bad years. In order
to do so, it has to specify ranges of application rates,
making the plan virtually meaningless as a regula-
tory instrument.
Most environmental problems in agriculture pre-
sent the same kinds of difficulties—spatial hetero-
geneity and temporal variability make it virtually
impossible to write regulations specifying exactly
what measures farmers ought to take (and to verify
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course, the predominance of spatial heterogeneity
and temporal variability in and of themselves gives
us a strong reason to believe direct regulations are
inferior to incentives as a means of addressing envi-
ronmental problems in agriculture.
A substantial body of research has demonstrated
that spatial heterogeneity makes incentives superior
to direct regulation. In fact, we know from general
principles that the greater the degree of hetero-
geneity among firms, the greater the superiority of
incentives over direct regulation (Caswell and
Zilberman, 1986; Lichtenberg, 1989, 2002). Further-
more, applying Weitzman’s prices-versus-quantities
analysis to farming indicates that when farmers can
respond to temporal variability, incentives are pref-
erable to direct regulation unless marginal environ-
mental damage is a lot more responsive to temporal
variations than agricultural production (Lichtenberg,
2002).
Superiority of Taxes over Subsidies
Perhaps the second most important policy approach
to problems like nutrient pollution and animal
wastes has been to offer subsidies for farmers
adopting resource-conserving farming systems
intended to reduce adverse environmental effects.
Economic research has shown there are significant
problems associated with those kinds of subsidies.
They give farmers incentives to expand production
onto land which could well be even more environ-
mentally sensitive (Caswell and Zilberman, 1986;
Lichtenberg, 2002). These subsidies are also prone
to targeting problems that limit their effectiveness
(Malik and Shoemaker, 1993; Lichtenberg and
Smith-Ramirez, 2003). In many cases they are sub-
ject to implementation problems: Unless they are
linked to durable changes in the landscape which
can be monitored accurately at relatively infrequent
intervals (and thus low cost), green payment con-
tracts are not enforceable because of the difficulty
of verifying the contracted actions have actually
been taken by farmers (Lichtenberg, 2002).
There have been practical problems with these
programs as well. The kinds of policies we’ve
relied on in the United States are basically retooled
policies for promoting soil conservation, paying
farmers to divert erodible land or share the costs of
installing conservation practices. They do not seem
to have been adapted very well to handling broader
problems of environmental degradation. As empiri-
cal studies of the Conservation Reserve Program
have shown, these policies have been implemented
in ways that maximize transfers to politically influ-
ential groups of farmers and, as a consequence,
minimize their environmental performance (Reichel-
derfer and Boggess, 1988; Ribaudo, 1989; Babcock
et al., 1997; Feather and Hellerstein, 1997). Empir-
ical studies of cost sharing demonstrate similar
problems—specifically, an emphasis on enhancing
farm productivity to the detriment of protecting
water quality, and the imposition of design require-
ments and other transaction costs that can actually
reduce conservation effort (Bastos and Lichtenberg,
2001; Lichtenberg and Smith-Ramirez, 2003).
Bureaucratic culture may be one reason why con-
servation subsidy programs have not been adapted
very well to meeting environmental goals. Agricul-
tural agencies at the federal, state, and even local
levels have a political constituency—the farm com-
munity. These agencies see themselves as being in
the business of helping this constituency, both
directly and by representing them in interagency
debates within government. R&D is consistent with
that mission, as is distributing subsidy funds. Reg-
ulation is not consistent with that mission, since it
necessarily puts the agencies in an adversarial rela-
tionship with farmers.
As a result, when managed through an agricul-
tural agency, every program aimed at promoting
environmental goals is ultimately administered in a
way that maximizes benefits to farmers, even when
doing so minimizes the environmental achievements
identified as the principal ostensible reason for the
program in the first place. Enforcement of the
conservation compliance provisions of existing
farm legislation demonstrates this tendency: Sixty
percent of non-compliance determinations were
waived on appeal, mostly on grounds that did not
seem very sound (U.S. General Accounting Office,
2003).
In sum, relying on conservation subsidies as the
main policy for handling environmental problems
in agriculture violates the principle of specialization
in policy instruments. Generally speaking, each
policy objective should be addressed with its own
policy instrument. Adding consideration of bureau-
cratic culture suggests positive services rendered to
farmers ought to be separated from functions like
environmental regulations which are inherently
negative and adversarial.
The upshot of this line of argument is that
tackling environmental problems emanating from
agriculture requires serious consideration of the
use of negative incentives—specifically, taxes on
polluting inputs used in agriculture or on ambient30   April 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
concentrations of pollutants known to emanate from
agriculture. Such a message will obviously not be
popular with the farm community. Consequently, it
is likely to be equally unpopular with agricultural
agencies at the federal, state, and local levels, all of
whom view the farm community as their political
constituency and recognize that policies which
penalize farmers are at odds with their fundamental
relationship with the farm community. Likewise,
such a message may not be popular with envi-
ronmental groups either; they tend to mistrust
incentive-based approaches to environmental regu-
lation because they don’t necessarily require regu-
lators to know concretely what actions regulated
firms have taken, which creates an appearance of
inaction.
Efficiency of Agricultural Pollution Taxes
I have argued that pollution taxes are the most effec-
tive way to meet environmental objectives in agri-
culture. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize
there will be limitations on how efficient those
pollution taxes can be, due to (a) the nonpoint
source nature of many of these pollution problems
(which limits performance monitoring),
2 and (b) the
fact that to be fully efficient, pollution taxes will
often need to be adjusted for location, crop type,
farming system, weather, and other factors—
adjustments which may prove impractical or even
infeasible. Even it proves infeasible to implement
pollution taxes that are fully efficient, however,
economic theory and practical experience suggest
pollution taxes will outperform any of the other
policy instruments at our disposal. In the words of
a common Washington adage, “it is important not
to let the perfect be the enemy of the good”—i.e.,
our inability to attain an ideal should not be a deter-
rent to implementing policies which perform well.
And for many problems, we can expect pollution
taxes to perform quite well.
Consider the case of pesticides. Environmental
damage from pesticides typically correlates with the
formulation (and thus application method) used and
the location of the field to which pesticides are
applied. For that reason, it should be feasible to
impose differential taxes on different formulations
of any given pesticide active ingredient (e.g., liquid
versus granular) (although additional measures may
be required in some cases to prevent dealers or
farmers from evading higher taxes by reformulating
pesticides themselves). Similarly, it should be feas-
ible to impose differential taxes on pesticides
purchased in different regions (although it may be
necessary to simultaneously implement enforcement
measures to limit smuggling). In fact, existing pesti-
cide regulation provides precedents for differential
treatment like this: EPA has banned certain formu-
lations while leaving other formulations of the same
compound on the market, and has canceled the reg-
istrations of chemicals in specific states or growing
regions while permitting legal use to continue in
other areas. It should, moreover, be feasible to set
differentials in tax rates so that they constitute a
reasonable approximation to needed adjustments
for risks to human health and the environment.
Erosion should also be straightforward to handle.
Environmental damage from erosion (sedimenta-
tion, nutrient pollution) typically varies according
to topography, soil characteristics, location (e.g.,
proximity to streams), crop choice, and farm
production practices, all of which are observable at
reasonably low cost. In contrast to variable input
use, most farm practices with significant effects on
erosion leave a lasting imprint on the landscape, so
they’re easily observed. In principle, then, it should
be fairly easy to levy erosion taxes on farmland,
adjusted for crop type and farming practices that
come close to being first-best.
Nutrient runoff and leaching from fertilizers, on
the other hand, are likely to be much less tractable
than either pesticides or soil erosion. Environmental
damage from fertilizers typically varies according
to both cropping pattern and attributes of land
quality such as slope and soil texture. As a result,
first-best fertilizer taxes would have to vary by land
quality, technology, and seasonal conditions—
which would be difficult to do. Because farmers use
the same fertilizer formulations on different crops
and different types of land, it would be hard to
2  The nonpoint source nature of agricultural pollution problems arises
largely from persistent spatial heterogeneity and temporal variability,
which make it excessively costly to monitor emissions from individual
farms. Pollutants tend to be diffused within each field, with small amounts
of emissions entering the environment from many different places in each
field. Farms (and even individual fields) differ in terms of soils,
topography, and other factors that influence crop uptake, the ability of
soils to hold nutrients and pesticides, factors that attract or repel animals,
etc. As a result, emissions differ within fields and across farms, creating
a need for excessively extensive monitoring. Unfortunately, one cannot
use a representative farm as a sufficient statistic for all—or even large
classes of—farms. While it might be possible in principle to measure
factors that influence leaching, runoff, air emissions to use as proxies for
emissions, there is enough heterogeneity across fields to make measuring
those factors very expensive. And current knowledge is inadequate to
permit derivation of formulas reliable enough for policy. In addition,
emissions vary stochastically, making monitoring by random periodic
inspections too inaccurate for policy purposes. That randomness makes
it too easy for periodic inspections to miss significant emissions, which
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impose differential taxes at the point of sale. Varia-
tions in yield can’t provide a basis for a differen-
tiated fertilizer tax because yield variations are
caused by many factors, including ones which are
not readily observable (e.g., seed variety, pest infes-
tation levels, microclimate), making it difficult to
infer fertilizer application rates from observed
yields. Also, the degree to which fertilizer use
causes problems depends critically on weather con-
ditions, so it varies markedly from year to year. As
noted previously, the same amount of fertilizer can
result in absolutely no runoff and leaching under
some growing conditions, and significant runoff
and leaching under others—which means fertilizer
taxes would have to be adjusted for weather in
order to induce a first-best.
A number of economists have suggested using
mechanism design as a basis for developing ferti-
lizer taxes, arguing fertilizer use is subject to
problems of hidden information (see, for example,
Wu and Babcock, 1995, 1996). Their underlying
postulate is that farmers know a lot about conditions
on their farms and make their fertilizer use decisions
accordingly, while regulators can’t observe those
conditions or farmers’ fertilizer use and can’t infer
fertilizer use from things they can observe, like
yields.
Unfortunately, hidden information mechanisms
don’t really work for agricultural chemicals because
they’re not self-enforcing. In essence, a mechanism
designed for hidden information is a nonlinear
pricing scheme (in our case, a nonlinear tax scheme),
allowing the regulator to acquire information that
is the farmer’s private property. This process of
information acquisition occurs only when certain
conditions are met. First, information must be linked
to something observable and subject to market
transactions. Second, market transactions for this
good or service must be equivalent to revealing the
private information. This is the essence of the
standard monotonicity condition—it means one can
infer private information from market transaction.
Third, the linkage between the amount of good or
service purchased and private information must be
firm, i.e., the two have to be nonseparable. Resale,
collective purchases, and storage suffice to break
this linkage. Only in the absence of these secondary
markets will truthtelling be self-enforcing in the
sense that market transaction actually reveals the
private information.
Problems involving chemicals don’t meet these
conditions and are thus not susceptible to the stan-
dard hidden information approach. For example, a
mechanism featuring a marginal tax on fertilizer
that increased with the quantity purchased could
easily be circumvented by farmers buying fertilizer
in smaller quantities than they wish to use, i.e., by
farmers making more trips to the supply store than
they otherwise would. Similarly, a mechanism
featuring a marginal tax on fertilizer that decreased
with the quantity purchased could easily be circum-
vented by collective purchase—having farmers join
together to buy their fertilizer in bulk, then splitting
up the fertilizer after purchase.
For all these reasons, it seems to me that environ-
mental problems associated with fertilizer runoff
and leaching present the greatest difficulty for
devising efficient policies, and thus are the prob-
lems most in need of creative new thinking. Because
they are also the most widespread environmental
problems here in the United States, creative ideas




To be fair, there has been a great deal of progress in
dealing with some of the adverse environmental
effects of modern agriculture, most notably with
pesticides and soil erosion. Nevertheless, the oppor-
tunities afforded by existing policies seem to be
reaching their limits. In the case of pesticides, of
course, direct regulation was sufficient for removing
the most damaging compounds from the market and
for helping convince farmers of the need to use
pesticides more judiciously (lest careless use lead to
removal of still more pesticides from the market).
But the tradeoffs we now face are increasingly
complex, putting them beyond the scope of what
direct regulation can accomplish with any degree of
efficiency. We’ve had much less success in dealing
with nutrient emissions and animal waste problems,
which have received little or no regulatory over-
sight.
I have argued here a shift to pollution taxes
would make regulation easier and more effective.
The reasons I gave mirror the classic arguments for
the superiority of the price system as a means of
3  Jim Shortle has suggested that taxing excess, rather than total, nutri-
ents (as has been used in Belgium and the Netherlands) might improve
the performance of fertilizer taxes. Such an approach could provide a
reasonable adjustment for weather-induced variations in leaching and
runoff, but would likely involve enforcement problems similar to those
encountered under nonlinear tax schemes. The central difficulty involved
in devising efficient policies for fertilizers is the sheer number of dimen-
sions of variability.32   April 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
allocating resources. Incentives allow farmers to
adjust their actions to the conditions they face,
which is important given the spatial heterogeneity
and temporal variability inherent in agriculture.
Incentives also allow farmers to adjust their actions
to their individual level of expertise and manage-
ment ability. And incentives economize on the
information regulators need to have—they put the
emphasis back on monitoring environmental per-
formance rather than trying to second-guess what
farmers might do. Since theory and experience have
taught us that subsidies don’t work well for reasons
of both basic economics and sound administration,
pollution taxes are left as the instrument of choice.
Agricultural pollution taxes face some formidable
administrative and political challenges. But I think
there are some grounds for optimism, provided that,
as a profession, we persist in our advocacy. After
all, the introduction of emissions trading into air
pollution regulation was feasible largely because
the economics profession consistently advocated it
in the policy arena and in the classroom.
Aside from political problems, there remains an
important technical obstacle to tightening up envi-
ronmental regulation of any kind aimed at agricul-
ture—the lack of reliable means of monitoring
performance. The nonpoint source nature of most
agricultural pollution problems makes it extremely
difficult to monitor policy performance directly.
Instead, it’s necessary to rely on a combination of
observations of ambient environmental quality and
models that allow us to attribute changes in ambient
environmental quality to various sources (National
Research Council, 2001).
Unfortunately, most of the models currently in
use do a very poor job of linking farming activities
with ambient environmental conditions. Standard
simulation packages like EPIC or the Universal Soil
Loss Equation attempt to model impacts only at
field boundaries, ignoring transport and environ-
mental fate. As a result, the estimates they produce
provide very little information about linkages be-
tween changes in farming and changes in ambient
environmental quality, as Trimble and Crosson
(2000) have demonstrated for soil erosion [see also
Braden et al. (1989) for a discussion of the impor-
tance of transport and environmental fate processes
for policy formulation].
This dearth of models needed for policy analysis
suggests it is absolutely essential for economists to
get our hands dirty in the interdisciplinary work of
producing models linking farming with actual ambi-
ent environmental quality. Unlike many disciplines,
training in economics emphasizes analytical and
systems thinking and the primacy of performance
over process, conceptual foundations which give
economists a better sense of how to formulate and
utilize models for policy analysis than natural scien-
tists. But that training alone does not suffice; econo-
mists need to learn enough of the natural science to
be able to extract from the scientific literature and
from interdisciplinary interactions a sense of which
processes and parameters are key, of what can be
simplified productively and what cannot.
There are many ways in which this kind of inter-
disciplinary work is frustrating. It takes time to form
compatible partnerships and establish productive
working relationships. Interdisciplinary work also
involves greater academic risks. It is often difficult to
publish interdisciplinary work in journals that matter
the most in terms of disciplinary academic recog-
nition. Nevertheless, the rewards on the policy side
may provide some compensation for those risks (as
may the chance of high impact publication). The
fields of agricultural and resource economics both
evolved from our broader discipline of general eco-
nomics in response to a need to address specific
policy questions. Continuing that tradition today
requires training ourselves and our students in the
scientific aspects of agricultural pollution problems;
without that training it will not be possible for us to
make real contributions to policy in this area.
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